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WHY THE RYAN-BRADY TAX PROPOSAL WILL BE FOUND TO BE
INCONSISTENT WITH WTO LAW
Jennifer Hillman*

The tax-reform plan released by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady is intended to improve our
corporate tax system by, among other things, taxing companies based on where they sell
their goods, not where the business is located or where the goods are made.1 To do so,
the ambitious reforms would set up a system in which corporations pay taxes on their

* Jennifer Hillman is a visiting professor of law at Georgetown Law. She is a former Chairman of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a former general counsel at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative. The author wishes to thank Christopher Brummer, Itai Grinberg,
Gary Hufbauer and Chad Bown for their comments, but all errors or omissions are her own.
The tax plan is laid out in “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America,” June 24, 2016, often
referred to as “The Blueprint for America,” https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWayTax-PolicyPaper.pdf. Because the details of exactly how the Ryan-Brady cash-flow tax would work in
practice have not been made available, it is impossible to know for certain exactly how the new tax system
would work. The analysis in this article is based on the description of the plan contained in the Blueprint
and statements and responses to questions by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady.
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U.S. sales revenues, with deductions permitted for the cost of input materials and labor,
along with exclusions for the value of export sales.
Although policymakers rarely need to take the World Trade Organization (WTO)
or its rules into account when devising tax policy, the proposal outlined in the
Republican Blueprint for a cash flow tax does have significant WTO implications. While
many proponents have said that plan is fully consistent with our WTO obligations, or at
least that the WTO-consistency of the plan is “ambiguous,” that contention rests on a
blurring of the distinction between taxes imposed on imports with rebates or exclusions
for exports, combining the two under the overall notion of “border adjusted taxes” or
BTAs.2 As this Issue Brief explains, as currently described, the Ryan-Brady taxes on
imports are a clear violation of WTO rules while the rebates or exclusion from taxes for
exports presents a murkier picture.
The speed with which WTO disciplines can be imposed also vary between imports
and exports. Claims that the cash-flow tax’s application to imports violates the WTO
would follow the traditional WTO dispute settlement rules, potentially taking two or
more years for a decision on whether a violation has occurred, with significant
additional time added on for compliance and possible further litigation over whether
any changes the US might make in response to an adverse ruling bring about actual
compliance.3 Disputes claiming that the exemption for exports from the sales revenue
base violates the WTO rules on subsidies would, on the other hand, potentially be
subject to the WTO’s expedited dispute process for claims involving prohibited export
subsidies or relatively fast action by our trading partners to impose countervailing
duties on US exports that cause injury to their domestic producers. As a result, any U.S.
violations would likely generate several opportunities for relatively expeditious reprisals
by other WTO member states.

Ways and Means Committee Chairman Brady, for example, said in a statement “"We are now in the
process of designing all aspects of our 'Built for Growth' tax plan to withstand any WTO challenge. We're
confident we can win any case." The Blueprint itself states (at 28): “With this Blueprint’s move toward a
consumption-based tax approach, in the form of a cash-flow focused approach for taxing business income,
the United States now has the opportunity to incorporate border adjustments in the new tax system
consistent with the WTO rules regarding indirect taxes.”
3 While the suggested time frames in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) call for
disputes with appeals to be resolved in 15 months’ time, for a maximum of 15 months as a reasonable
period of time by which the US would need to have changed its tax system to comply with any adverse
ruling and for a quick resolution of any follow-on disputes over whether compliance has in fact been
achieved (Article 21.5 proceedings), the reality is that most cases are being extended beyond the deadlines
set forth in the DSU. A more likely scenario with respect to imports is two plus years for the litigation, 15
months as a reasonable period of time for compliance, and another eight or ten months for Article 21.5
proceedings, such that retaliation against the US for its tax on imports would not likely be authorized by
the WTO for closer to five years from the date of enactment of the cash-flow tax.
2
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A (Brief) Overview of the Ryan-Brady Plan

While the details of the Ryan-Brady Plan have not yet been released, the basic
contours of the proposal are spelled out in the Blueprint and include changes to
individual income tax rates, the abolishment of both the Alternative Minimum Tax
(AMT) and estate taxes, along with changes to corporate taxes that are the subject of this
Issue Brief. On the corporate side, the Blueprint calls for the reduction in the corporate
tax rate from 35% to 20% and the conversion from a corporate tax system that taxes US
corporations on their worldwide earnings to a destination-based consumption system
that taxes revenues based on where goods or services are consumed. The 20% tax would
be imposed on the revenue generated by the sale of goods or services in the US, with
immediate write-offs for new investments and deductions for US inputs and labor costs.
Deductions would not be permitted for imported inputs. As such, the 20% corporate
tax will be fully imposed on imports because they are sold or consumed in the US but
not imposed on exports because they are consumed outside the US.4
The Blueprint notes that it is designed to eliminate “the existing self-imposed
export penalty and import subsidy by moving to a destination-basis tax system” It does
this through the use of border adjustments exempting exports and taxing imports.
Border adjustments “mean that it does not matter where a company is incorporated;
sales to U.S. customers are taxed and sales to foreign customers are exempt, regardless
of whether the taxpayer is foreign or domestic.”5
As an example, if a US clothing manufacturer makes and sells one dress in the
United States for $100, a tax base of $100 results. If the manufacturer used domestic
fabric that cost $40 in the dress, $10 worth of domestic thread, trim and buttons and
$20 in labor, the manufacturer would deduct from the $100 base the cost of all the
inputs ($100 – 40 – 10 – 20 = $30) and would owe a tax of $6 ($30 x.20) based on the
new 20% corporate rate. If that same manufacturer made a second dress that also sold
for $100 using $40 of imported fabric rather than domestic fabric, with the same $10 in
domestic thread, trim and buttons and $20 in labor, the manufacturer would not be able
to deduct the cost of the imported fabric. The 20% tax would thus be applied to the
$100 base minus only the domestic inputs ($100 – 10-20 = $70) for a tax amount of $14
($70 x .20). As such, on the total tax base of $200 for two dresses, the manufacturer
4

The Blueprint (at 27) notes “Under a destination-based approach, tax jurisdiction follows the location of
consumption rather than the location of production. This Blueprint achieves this by providing for border
adjustments exempting exports and taxing imports . . . The Blueprint also ends the uncompetitive
worldwide tax approach of the United States, replacing it with a territorial tax system that is consistent
with the approach used by our major trading partners.”
5 Blueprint at 27.
3

would owe $20 ($6+$14) in taxes. If, however, the manufacturer sold one of the two
dresses overseas for $100, that $100 export sale would not be included in the tax base,
so the manufacturer would deduct all of the domestic inputs ($100-40-10-20-10-20 =
$0) for both dresses from the $100 base and would owe no tax.

Why the Plan’s Treatment of Imports Run Afoul of the WTO

At the core of the WTO rules is the concept of national treatment—which means
that no country can treat its domestic production more favorably than it treats foreign
imports.6 The Congress is free to impose any tax it likes on domestic goods or services,
but if it seeks to apply that same tax to imports, the amount of the tax on imports cannot
exceed the amount of the tax on US goods or services.7
So the question of the WTO-consistency of the Ryan-Brady plan’s application to
imports rests on the question of whether the plan results in a tax on imports at all and if
so, whether the amount of the tax paid on imports is more than the tax paid on
comparable domestic products.8 It appears from the current design of the plan that the
answer to those questions is yes.9
The Ryan-Brady approach to corporate taxes begins with the imposition of a 20%
tax on the sales revenue from all products or services consumed in the United States.
From that base of sales revenues, the plan, at least as it is usually described in public
discourse, permits a deduction for the value of input materials and labor used to
produce the good or service. However, the plan as described would not permit a
deduction for the cost of imported input materials or services. Therefore, US
companies will be paying 20% in taxes on the revenue from the sales of any goods or
Article III.2 of the GATT/WTO provides “The products of [any WTO member] imported into the
territory of any other [WTO member] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”
7 It is the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that contains the national treatment
obligation with respect to trade in goods. The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and the United States’ commitments in its GATS schedules include a comparable, but not identical,
national treatment obligation with respect to imports of services.
8 The question of whether the cash-flow tax is a tax imposed on imports (as opposed to a tax on the profits
of domestic corporations that receive the revenue from their ultimate sale) is related to the issue discussed
below of whether the tax would be considered a direct tax on producers versus an indirect tax on
products. As a general rule, it is only indirect taxes that are considered eligible for border adjustments.
9 The Blueprint states that it provides for border adjustments “exempting exports and taxing imports” and
that “products, services and intangibles that are imported into the United States will be subject to U.S. tax
regardless of where they are produced,” making it clear that the tax applies to all imports. Blueprint for
America at 27-28.
6

4

services that they import. The lack of a deduction for imports would be considered
either:
1) the equivalent of a tax on imports themselves—which in WTO terms
will be considered a tariff on the imports, which would violate our
obligation under Article II of the GATT to charge no more in tariffs than is
set forth in our tariff schedule10, or would violate the Article II
requirement not to impose on imports an “other duty or charge of any
kind,”11 or
2) the application of an internal tax to imports—which is permitted under
Article II(2)(a) of the GATT so long as it does not violate our national
treatment requirements--meaning the tax on imports is not greater than
the tax on comparable domestically-made goods.12
Either way, the absence of a deduction for the value of imports would be
considered a tax or an “other charge” on imports, subject to the rules of the WTO. If it
is considered an “other charge” on imports, it is entirely prohibited. If, as is far more
likely, it is considered an internal tax on domestic products that has also been imposed
on imports (“a charge equivalent to an internal tax” under Article II(2)(a)), then it is
subject to the national treatment test that it not impose a tax that treats imports less
favorably than domestic products.13
Because the Ryan-Brady plan would permit the cost of domestic wages and
domestic input materials to be deducted from the value of domestically-made goods but
not from the value of imports, the amount of the cash flow tax would unquestionably be
more for imports than for domestically-made goods. This treatment would be a clear

Because the US has chosen to bind virtually all of its tariffs in a schedule filed with the WTO and to
charge imports only the tariff rate that is reflected in that schedule, the imposition of any amount of
additional tariff on imports would violate the US’ tariff schedule commitments.
11 Article II of GATT prohibits charging tariffs in excess of those in each country’s tariff schedule. It also
provides that imports “shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with [importation].” Article II:1(b).
12 GATT Article II: 2(a) provides an exception to the ban on additional tariffs or charges on imports for “a
charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III
(national treatment requirement) in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.” Article III:2 (second
sentence) places a similar requirement to ensure that any taxes imposed on imports that are directly
competitive or substitutable (but not necessarily “like”) domestic products be similar to the taxes imposed
on domestic products.
13 GATT Article III:1 states the recognition that “internal taxes and other internal charges . . . should not
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
10
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violation of the basic national treatment rules of the WTO.14 The reduction in revenue
from domestic sales by any amount of domestic labor costs would result in a lesser
amount of tax on domestically-made goods than on comparable imported goods.
Whether a lesser tax on domestic products would also stem from the use of domestic
input materials would depend on whether the cash-flow tax already collected on the sale
of the domestic inputs themselves precisely offsets the value of the deduction for using
the domestically-made input in the final product. If it did not, then the exclusion of the
value of domestic input materials from domestic goods but not from imports could
exacerbate the amount of discrimination against imports.
A finding of discrimination would be true whether the tax was considered a direct
tax on producers or an indirect tax on products. And the test for discrimination is a
strict one—if the tax on imports is higher than the tax on domestic products by even a
tiny fraction, a violation can be deemed to have occurred.15
Those contending that the Ryan-Brady tax is consistent with the WTO largely
base their claims on the contention that this tax would be analogous to a Value-Added
Tax (VAT). VAT taxes are widely used throughout the world and are routinely imposed
on imported goods with no claims of WTO violations.16 However, there are critical
distinctions between the Ryan-Brady plan and traditional VAT taxes. The most
important difference is the exemption for wages that would be permitted under the
Ryan-Brady plan but is not a feature of traditional VATs. Moreover, all taxes on
imports—including traditional VATs—are subject to the national treatment
requirement, so if a traditional VAT were imposed in a manner that discriminated
against imports, it would also violate the WTO.

See, for example, Hufbauer and Lu, “Border Tax Adjustments: Assessing Risks and Rewards,” Peterson
Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 17-3, January 2017, which notes: “The deduction of
wages means that the chain of value subject to taxation never reaches worker compensation. Hence the
cash flow tax rate, when applied to the entire cost of imported inputs, reaches a broader tax base (since it
includes direct and indirect wages) than when applied jut to cash flow (which excludes these wages). The
result is a tax on imported inputs that exceeds the tax on cash flow.”
15 According to the Appellate Body, “[e]ven the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much. The prohibition of
discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it
qualified by a de minimis standard.” Appellate Body Report, Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 23.
16 Most countries utilizing a VAT system use a “credit method” VAT under which businesses can deduct
from their VAT liability the amount of VATs already paid by the producers of any inputs the business buys
to make the good or service sold. Japan, on the other hand, uses a form of “subtraction-method” VAT
under which businesses subtract the cost of inputs from their total sales value and then pay a VAT
calculated on the basis of the resulting amount of sales revenue.
14
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Why the Plan’s Treatment of Exports May Not Necessarily Violate WTO
Obligations (But Probably Does)

The WTO disciplines on exports are different from those on imports, as they are
centered on preventing government finances from being used to subsidize exports.17
Therefore, the threshold question is whether the Ryan-Brady cash flow tax’s treatment
of exports will constitute a subsidy. Subsidies are defined in the WTO rules as a
financial contribution by a government or public body that confers a benefit on the
recipient.18 A financial contribution is further defined to include “government revenue
that is otherwise due [that] is foregone or not collected.”19 Therefore, whether the
Ryan-Brady plan’s approach to exports is permissible turns in part on whether it results
in the government foregoing revenue that would otherwise be due. The Blueprint states
that the cash-flow tax will be applied on a destination basis such that “products, services
and intangibles that are exported outside the United States will not be subject to U.S. tax
regardless of where they are produced.”20 The claim would then be that because
exports are not consumed in the United States, they are simply not subject to the US
cash-flow tax. Therefore, no government revenue that was “otherwise due” has been
foregone by not including exports in the base on which taxes are collected and therefore
no subsidy has been provided.
The WTO’s jurisprudence recognizes the difficulty of determining exactly when
tax revenue has been “forgone.” For example, the WTO’s Appellate Body noted:
“[T]he word ‘foregone’ suggests that the government has given up an
entitlement to raise revenue that it could otherwise have raised. This
cannot, however be an entitlement in the abstract, because governments,
in theory, could tax all revenues. There must, therefore, be some defined
normative benchmark against which a comparison can be made between
the revenue actually raised and the revenue that would have been raised
‘otherwise’ . . .21
In general, the jurisprudence suggests that revenue otherwise due is considered
“foregone” when there is a general rule of taxation and certain exceptions to that general
The WTO rules on subsidies, codified in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(ASCM), expressly prohibit subsidies that promote exports because of the trade-distorting nature of
export subsidies.
18 ASCM Article 1.1.
19 ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
20 Blueprint for America, p. 28.
21 Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, paras. 90-91.
17

7

rule. If so, the exceptions may result in the government foregoing revenue that was
otherwise due, thereby conferring a financial benefit on those that qualify for the
exception.22 Here, it could be argued that if the general rule is that because exports are
not consumed in the US, they are not included in the Ryan-Brady destination-based
consumption tax, then there is no exception to a general rule and no revenue that the
government is giving up by not taxing exports.
However, it is not yet known exactly how the Ryan-Brady tax plan will be
designed. If the treatment of exports were structured not as an exclusion from taxes in
the first place but rather as an exemption from taxes due or a rebate on taxes paid, then
it could come under the WTO disciplines on subsidies, particularly its rules on export
subsidies. While this may appear to be putting form over substance, the sequencing of
the analysis and the text of the WTO Agreements are important. Both are clear that the
issue of whether a prohibited export subsidy has been granted starts with a
determination that a subsidy exists in the first place. Indeed, the text for prohibited
subsides starts with “the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1
(definition of subsidy, including reference to foregone revenues) shall be prohibited.”23
As such, if a subsidy does not fall within the meaning of Article 1, it is not subject to the
prohibition on export subsidies contained in ASCM Article 3.24 The ambiguity in how
the Ryan-Brady tax might be viewed stems in part from the use of the words
“exemptions,” ”remissions,” “deferrals” or “deductions” when describing taxes that may
constitute a subsidy (as discussed below) when contrasted with the definition in Article
1, which provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if, among other things, the
government has foregone revenue that is otherwise due through the use of tax credits.
If the Ryan-Brady tax plan should be found to result in the government giving up on

See, for example, US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), where the Panel summarized the
Appellate Body’s guidance as “[t]he Appellate Body’s analysis suggests that where it is possible to identify
a general rule of taxation applied by the Member in question, a ‘but for’ test can be applied. In other
situations, the challenged taxation measure should be compared to the treatment applied to comparable
income, for taxpayers in comparable circumstances, in the jurisdiction in issue.” Para. 7.120.
23 ASCM Article 3.1. See also Panel Report, Canada-Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, WT/DS222, para.
7.16, “To prove the existence of an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision, a Member must
therefore establish (i) the existence of a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement
and (ii) contingency of that subsidy upon export performance.”
24 The WTO jurisprudence is clear that the prohibition on export subsidies contained in Article 3 and the
Illustrative List do not override the basic definition of a subsidy contained in Article I of the ASCM, which
requires a demonstration of foregone revenue. The Appellate Body in US-FSC noted “Article 1.1 sets forth
the general definition of the term "subsidy" which applies ‘for the purpose of this Agreement’. This
definition, therefore, applies wherever the word "subsidy" occurs throughout the SCM Agreement and
conditions the application of the provisions of that Agreement regarding prohibited subsidies in Part II,
actionable subsidies in Part III, non-actionable subsidies in Part IV and countervailing measures in Part
V.” para. 93.
22
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revenue that would otherwise be due, then the disciplines on export subsidies would
apply.
As a general matter, subsidies for exports are prohibited, while non-export
subsidies are subject to disciplines as “actionable” subsidies only if they cause adverse
effects to other countries.25 The ASCM includes some guidance on which subsidies
constitute prohibited export subsidies in its Illustrative List of Export Subsides (Annex I
to ASCM). That Illustrative List includes a number of tax measures that would
constitute prohibited export subsidies and draws a distinction between direct taxes (on
producers) and indirect taxes (on products), defining direct taxes as “taxes on wages,
profits . . . and all other forms of incomes” while defining indirect taxes as “sales, excise,
turnover, value added . . . and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.” 26
As such, the Illustrative List suggests that rebates or deductions or refunds for taxes
related to exports are permitted under the WTO rules if two conditions are met:
1) The tax must be considered an indirect tax on products, rather than a
direct tax on producers; and
2) The rebate on exports must not exceed the amount levied on the same
goods or services when they are sold for domestic consumption in the
U.S.27
While there has been considerable debate about where to draw the line between
(direct) taxes on producers versus (indirect) taxes on products, the WTO-consistency of
the Ryan-Brady plan could depend on which side of the line the tax falls on.28
ASCM Article 3. “[T]he following subsidies . . . shall be prohibited: a) subsidies contingent, in law or
in fact . . . upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I (the Illustrative List).”
(emphasis added).
26 ASCM, Annex I, footnote 58.
27 The two direct taxes expressly noted as prohibited exports subsides are: 1) the full or partial exemption
remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or
payable by . . . commercial enterprises, and 2) the allowance of special deductions directly related to
exports or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic
consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged. (items e) and f) in the
Illustrative List). The discipline on indirect taxes, on the other hand, bars only tax breaks for exports
that exceed those provided for domestically-produced goods (“The exemption or remission, in respect of
the production and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in
respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.” (item g)
in Illustrative List) (emphasis added).
28 The 1970 GATT Working Party on Border Adjustments concluded that there was a consensus that taxes
on products, such as excise taxes, sales taxes, and VATs, were eligible for border adjustment, while taxes
not directly levied on products, such as social security or payroll taxes, were not eligible for border
adjustment. Paragraph 14, 1970 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464. November
20, 1970. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” taxes, see
25
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Therefore, the structure and design of the Ryan-Brady plan will be important in
determining whether its treatment of exports fits within either the carve out from the
definition of a subsidy for exports exempted from domestic taxes29 or the allowance for
exemptions or rebates from indirect taxes that do not exceed the rebate available for
domestic goods.30
The more that the plan is structured as a direct tax on producers by imposing
taxes based on the producers’ accounts of their total revenues with deductions for inputs
and wages, the more likely the overall tax plan is likely to be seen as a direct tax, not
eligible for border adjustment. The more the tax is structured as a tax on sales, the
more likely it is to be considered an indirect tax, for which border adjustments are
permitted. In defending the border adjustability of the tax plan, the US can also claim
that the tax falls within the catch-all phrase included within the definition of an indirect
tax (“all taxes other than direct taxes”) with the burden on those challenging the tax to
prove that the tax is a direct tax, but whether that argument would carry the day is not
certain. However, as described above, the definition of the base will also be important
to this analysis, because in principle, if the base does not include foreign consumption,
then the direct / indirect tax distinction does not matter.
Finally, the Ryan-Brady cash-flow tax, should it be structured in way that
constitutes a subsidy, will need to be carefully designed not to violate the second
requirement for permissible rebates or exemptions from taxes on exports—that the
amount of the rebate granted to exports does not exceed the amount of tax on like
products sold for domestic consumption. 31 If the amount of the export rebate is equal
to the total sales value of the good while the same good sold for domestic consumption
pays tax on the total sales value minus the cost of domestic inputs and labor, then the
export rebate could also run afoul of the second requirement.
The consequences of being found to be a prohibited export subsidy are severe.
Prohibited export subsidies are considered per se violations of the ASCM because they
promote exports over domestic consumption, thereby creating trade distortions.
Because they are expressly prohibited, challenges to export subsidies do not require any
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax: Advantages of Adopting the VAT Credit-Method
System, Itai Grinberg, National Tax Journal, Vol. LIX, No.4, December 2006.
29 “[T]he exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined
for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those
which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.” (ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii), footnote 1)
(emphasis added).
30 The Illustrative List (item (g)) prohibits exemptions from indirect taxes only when “the exemption or
remission, in respect of the production and distribution of exported products . . . [is] in excess of those
levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.”
31 Item (g), Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, Annex I, ASCM.
10

proof that the subsidy is specific to a given enterprise or industry nor do they require
proof that the subsidy causes adverse effect to others.32 Moreover, disputes over
prohibited export subsidies are subject to expedited dispute settlement procedures, as
seen in the time frames set forth in Table 1 below. Note that the actual time frame in
many traditional disputes has been longer than suggested by the rules.

Table 1: Time Frames for WTO
Disputes Under the DSU Rules

Traditional
Disputes33

Prohibited
Subsidy
Disputes34

Consultations
Panel proceedings
Time to request appeal of panel ruling
Appellate Body (AB) proceedings
Adoption of panel/AB reports
Reasonable Period of Time for compliance
Compliance proceedings (panel + AB)
Total

60 days
180 to 270 days
60 days
90 days max
30 days
460 days
180 days
1,060 to 1,150 days
(2.9 to 3.1 years)

30 days
90 days
30 days
60 days max
20 days
Without delay
90 days
320-360 days
(less than 1 year)

Because the WTO-consistency of the Ryan-Brady tax plan’s approach to exports
depends on a number of determinations—whether a subsidy has been provided and if
so, whether the tax is a direct tax on producers—the picture for exports is much murkier
than for imports. The plan’s treatment of imports is a clear violation of the WTO rules,
while the treatment of exports is less clear.

How the WTO (and Others) Could Punish the United States for Treaty
Violations

Some commentators examining the tax plan take comfort from the fact that WTO
disputes tend to be lengthy and that the disciplines, at least with respect to export
subsidies, may be uncertain. According to this view, the US therefore has lots of time
ASCM Article 2.3. “Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 (prohibited subsidies) shall be
deemed to be specific.”
33 Time frames for most disputes are provided in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
The expedited rules for disputes over prohibited subsidies are set forth in Article 4 of the ASCM and take
precedence over the traditional time frames pursuant to Appendix 2 to the DSU.
34 In addition to the specific time frames noted in Table 2, Article 4.12 of the ASCM provides that all other
time periods applicable shall be half the time prescribed in the DSU rules for traditional disputes.
32
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before our trading partners will be authorized to retaliate against the United States
should the tax plan be found to violate WTO rules. Others contend that few countries
would be willing to challenge the US in such a big dispute, fearing retaliation or other
measures restricting their access to the US market. Yet others take the view that the US
will be given significant leeway as it seeks to reframe its tax code to better align the US
system with other countries around the world and to reduce the incentives to locate
production facilities abroad. Some claim that the case is so unusual and so large that
the WTO would be reluctant to take it on for fear that it could destroy the trading
system.
All of these arguments deserve to be heard and understood. While it is true that
a WTO challenge to the Ryan-Brady tax plan and an ultimate determination permitting
retaliation would be highly unusual, there is no mechanism in the dispute settlement
system for the WTO to refuse to hear a case just because it is very large or politically
difficult. The authorization of retaliation is in itself fairly rare, with only 13 out of more
than 500 disputes resulting in authorized retaliation. And the amount of retaliation
that could be permitted is far beyond anything seen in the WTO. Chad Bown from the
Peterson Institute of International Economics suggests that retaliation for the
discrimination against imports would be at least $220 billion, while the exclusion for
export sales could bring an additional $165 billion in further permitted retaliation.35
The highest previous amount of authorized retaliation was $4.043 billion in the case
against the US tax exemptions for foreign sales corporations which were found to be
prohibited export subsidies.36 But because the WTO cannot refuse to resolve any
dispute submitted to it, the size of the case will not prevent an adjudication of the issue,
or an authorization for retaliation should the US not comply with an adverse ruling.
Nor is fear of retaliation likely to deter a challenge to the Ryan-Brady tax, as the
tax affects all US trading partners and those trading partners are likely to join together
in a single complaint, as multiple countries did when challenging China’s export
restrictions on rare earths and raw materials or in disputing the US safeguards on steel
and many others.37 As such, countries can easily seek the “safety in numbers” of a joint
challenge, as it would be impossible for the US to retaliate against all challengers
without starting a disastrous trade war.

PIIE forum, Border Tax Adjustments and Corporate Tax Reform, February 1, 2017,
https://piie.com/events/border-tax-adjustment-and-corporate-tax-reforms.
36 US-Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) (EC) WT/DS108
37 The challenge to the US safeguards on steel was brought by the Brazil, China, the EU, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The US joined with Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, and Panama in challenging the EU’s quota system on bananas. The challenge to China’s export
restrictions on raw and rare earth materials included the US, the EU, Japan, and Mexico.
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Nor should the length of time it takes to resolve a dispute at the WTO give much
comfort. A WTO challenge can be brought the minute a definitive tax plan is enacted,
even if it has not yet come into effect.38 Moreover, counting on having years of time
before facing the consequences of enacting a WTO-illegal scheme is risky. It presumes
that the rest of the world will abide by the WTO rules that prohibit countries from taking
unilateral action and will patiently go through the WTO dispute settlement system. But
if the US adopts a tax scheme that is a clear violation of the WTO rules and that is
perceived by the world as a willful violation on our part, it may invite other countries to
respond in kind.
Finally, the WTO rules provide for two types of actions against subsidized
exports—1) a WTO case because export subsidies are prohibited, for which the remedy is
a ruling that the subsidy be removed, and 2) a case for the imposition of countervailing
duties (CVD), for which the remedy is the imposition of additional duties in an amount
calculated to offset the value of the subsidy. A number of the United States’ trading
partners could seek such additional duties on US exports because CVDs can be imposed
relatively quickly through a domestic process that does not require waiting for a WTO
ruling. If our trading partners can show that the tax plan results in subsidies to our
exports and that the subsidized exports caused injury to their domestic producers
manufacturing products like our exports, then they can unilaterally impose additional
duties on US exports, without the approval of either the United States or the WTO.
Such CVD claims could result in the imposition of additional duties on US exports
within 12 to 15 months.
In sum, the enactment of a tax plan that includes provisions that are clear
violations of our WTO obligations risks significant litigation, retaliation from our
trading partners, possible additional duties on US exports, and carries the potential to
start a trade war. The Congress should be very careful in enacting reforms to our
corporate tax system to avoid obvious WTO violations.

There are already reports that the EU is preparing a challenge to the Ryan-Brady plan, should it be
enacted as it appears to be currently envisioned. “EU and others gear up for WTO challenge to US border
tax,” Financial Times, February 13, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/cdaa0b76-f20d-11e6-87586876151821a6
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